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JUDICIAL VALUATION BEHAVIOR: SOME 
EVIDENCE FROM BANKRUPTCY 
KEITH SHARFMAN* 
ABSTRACT 
 This Article presents an empirical study of judicial valuation in 
the bankruptcy context, focusing on twenty-four valuation disputes 
in which a bankruptcy judge reached a valuation outcome between 
the values contended for by the parties. Two main findings emerged 
from the cases studied: (1) bankruptcy judges on average allocated 
65.2% of the value in controversy to debtors and 34.8% to secured 
creditors; and (2) bankruptcy judges were more than three times as 
likely to allocate most of the value in controversy to debtors as they 
were to secured creditors. These results lend empirical support to 
the behaviorist intuition that loss aversion bias informs judicial de-
cisionmaking and may have further implications for substantively 
neutral reform of the processes whereby valuation disputes are re-
solved. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Valuation litigation is notoriously unpredictable.1 When the value 
of a legal entitlement is in dispute, one party typically will ask for a 
high valuation, the other for a low one, and each will offer evidence 
in support of its position. The trier of fact may in the end agree with 
one side or the other, but could just as easily settle upon a third 
value of its own choosing. The valuation inquiry is thus inherently 
imprecise, a discretionary exercise that depends largely on the 
                                                                                                                    
 * Associate Professor and Philip Shuchman Scholar, Rutgers University School of 
Law-Newark. Many thanks to Andrew Ackerman, Allan Axelrod, Douglas Baird, Neal Bu-
chanan, Charles Davenport, Claire Moore Dickerson, Philip Hamburger, Michael Heise, 
Jonathan Hyman, John Leubsdorf, Gregory Mark, Greg Mitchell, Daniel Polsby, Shawn 
Pompian, Jeffrey Rachlinski, Jim Rossi, Mark Seidenfeld, Mark Weiner, Jason Yeung, the 
Philip Shuchman Fund for Empirical Research, and participants at a symposium on the 
Behavioral Analysis of Legal Institutions held in the spring of 2004 at the Florida State 
University College of Law. 
 1. See, e.g., Christopher P. Bowers, Courts, Contracts, and the Appropriate Discount 
Rate: A Quick Fix for the Legal Lottery, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1099, 1126-29 (1996) (likening 
the arbitrariness of legal valuation to a “lottery”). 
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whims and predispositions of the factfinder. Given this imprecision, 
conventional legal scholarship has been unable to articulate a con-
vincing theory of legal valuation.2 Rather than theorize about which 
valuation methodologies courts can, should, and do employ, the fa-
vored approach has been to shift away from valuation method and to 
focus instead on process reforms that would lead to more predictable 
outcomes in valuation litigation.3 
 Behavioral analysts of law, however, have yet to give up searching 
for a viable theory of legal valuation. They are unsatisfied by the 
failure of conventional scholarship to go beyond the “inherent impre-
cision” thesis and have sought ambitiously through both theory and 
data to offer a more robust account.4 The behavioral approach seeks 
first to understand how individuals handle questions of valuation 
and then to extrapolate from insights about individuals to an analy-
sis of legal institutions.5 Rather than accept the claim that there is 
no rhyme or reason to legal valuation, behaviorists have sought to 
explain legal valuation outcomes that seem irrational, inconsistent, 
or unpredictable in light of cognitive limitations and biases to which 
                                                                                                                    
 2. The leading treatise on the subject simply describes the law’s incoherence with re-
spect to valuation without offering any theory to explain it. JAMES C. BONBRIGHT, THE 
VALUATION OF PROPERTY: A TREATISE ON THE APPRAISAL OF PROPERTY FOR DIFFERENT 
LEGAL PURPOSES 3, 7-9 (1937) (describing “the problem of judicial valuation” and “the ma-
jor task of developing the theory of legal valuation”); see also James C. Bonbright, The 
Problem of Judicial Valuation, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 493, 518 (1927) (concluding “that many 
differences in judicially accepted property values are quite unwarranted . . . and their pres-
ence can be accounted for only by favoritisms, confusions, and ineptitudes”). 
 3. See Keith Sharfman, Valuation Averaging: A New Procedure for Resolving Valua-
tion Disputes, 88 MINN. L. REV. 357 (2003) (proposing a valuation dispute resolution proc-
ess that recognizes the plausibility of competing valuation methodologies). For similar 
shifts in focus from method to process in particularized contexts, see Barry E. Adler & Ian 
Ayres, A Dilution Mechanism for Valuing Corporations in Bankruptcy, 111 YALE L.J. 83 
(2001). See also Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 127, 136-38 (1986) (proposing to replace judicial valuation of reorganizing 
firms with an auctions-based reorganization process); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Ap-
proach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. REV. 775, 785 (1988) (proposing to re-
place judicial valuation of reorganizing firms with the issuance of options to the firm’s 
stakeholders); Christian J. Henrich, Game Theory and Gonsalves: A Recommendation for 
Reforming Stockholder Appraisal Actions, 56 BUS. LAW. 697, 722-29 (2001) (proposing to 
replace judicial valuation of corporate appraisal with a final offer arbitration process); 
Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83 COLUM. 
L. REV. 527, 559 (1983) (proposing to replace judicial valuation of reorganizing firms with 
valuations based on market sales of the reorganizing firm's securities); Jay A. Soled, 
Transfer Tax Valuation Issues, the Game Theory, and Final Offer Arbitration: A Modest 
Proposal for Reform, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 283, 304-10 (1997) (proposing to replace judicial 
valuation in tax litigation with a final offer arbitration process).  
 4. See, e.g., David Cohen & Jack L. Knetsch, Judicial Choice and Disparities Be-
tween Measures of Economic Values, 30 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 737 (1992), reprinted in 
CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 424-50 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000). 
 5. Id. 
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judges and juries are systematically (and hence predictably) subject.6 
In particular, behaviorists claim that legal decisionmakers value 
losses more highly than gains and that apparent anomalies in legal 
valuation may best be understood in terms of “loss aversion” or 
“status quo preservation” biases in legal institutions that are analo-
gous to similar biases observed in individuals.7 According to this 
view, judges and juries will tend, other things being equal, to under-
value the legal entitlements of plaintiffs8 and overvalue the legal en-
titlements of defendants relative to some “objective” valuation bench-
mark such as market value. 
 A general critique of the behavioral approach to law (that also ap-
plies specifically in the valuation context) is that while it may suc-
ceed in explaining apparent behavioral irrationalities and inconsis-
tencies ex post, it does not offer more predictive value ex ante than 
the competing analytic frameworks (such as wealth maximization 
and rational choice theory) that it debunks and seeks to replace.9 A 
somewhat weaker version of this critique is that behaviorist explana-
tions of legal phenomena, while useful for identifying new variables 
that help to explain the behavior of actors in the legal system, are 
nevertheless incomplete. Knowing, for example, that judges and ju-
ries are biased in a particular way (against losses, say) does not 
really end the search for a theory of legal valuation. At most, identi-
fication of loss aversion as a bias helps to understand legal valuation 
better than it was previously, but it still cannot (and indeed does not 
purport to) explain the legal valuation phenomenon in its entirety. 
Behaviorists themselves appear to agree with their critics that more 
data and more theories are always useful and that identification of 
                                                                                                                    
 6. Id.; see also W. Kip Viscusi, Do Judges Do Better?, in PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW 
JURIES DECIDE 186, 206 (Cass R. Sunstein et al. eds., 2002) (“Judges are human and may 
reflect the same kinds of irrationalities as other individuals.”). 
 7. Cohen & Knetsch, supra note 4, at 749-69 (using the notion of loss aversion to ex-
plain such diverse legal phenomena as adverse possession, recovery of lost profits for 
breach of contract, enforceability of contractual modification, gratuitous promises, and re-
possession). On loss aversion bias more generally, see Daniel Kahneman et al., The En-
dowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1991, at 193. 
 8. I use the terms plaintiffs and defendants somewhat loosely here. By plaintiffs I 
mean parties who seek to gain wealth through assertion of a legal entitlement, and by de-
fendants I mean parties seeking to avoid a loss of wealth by disputing a legal claim. In the 
case of counterclaims, these labels are reversed. 
 9. See Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 
STAN. L. REV. 1551 (1998) (critiquing behavioralist approaches to law, such as Christine 
Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 
50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998), on this ground). More generally on the similarities and dif-
ferences between the two fields, see RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN 
ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY (Robin M. Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder eds., 1987). 
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new variables merely advances but does not end the behaviorist in-
quiry.10 
 The empirical approach taken in this Article should therefore be 
welcomed by both behaviorists and their critics. If the loss aversion 
theory of legal valuation is incorrect, empiricism can usefully provide 
evidence to negate it. Conversely, if behaviorists are right that loss 
aversion bias is a significant explanatory variable for legal valuation, 
the effect ought to be empirically demonstrable not only in experi-
mental settings but also in the “real world” of valuation litigation. 
With a stronger empirical foundation, the loss aversion theory of le-
gal valuation would become less conjectural and more convincing.  
 To these ends, this Article identifies and studies a doctrinal area 
in which loss aversion bias is likely at work and endeavors to docu-
ment empirically its manifestation and effects. The doctrinal area 
identified and examined is bankruptcy valuation litigation,11 and the 
study’s main empirical finding is that outcomes in bankruptcy valua-
tion litigation are consistent with a hypothesis of loss aversion bias. 
In addition to providing empirical evidence consistent with the loss 
aversion theory of legal valuation, the study also confirms anecdotal 
evidence that bankruptcy judges are “pro-debtor,”12 contradicting the 
findings of another recent study.13 
                                                                                                                    
 10. On the limits and pitfalls of empirical legal scholarship, see Symposium, Ex-
change: Empirical Research and the Goals of Legal Scholarship, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 
(2002); Symposium: Empirical and Experimental Methods in Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 791 
(2002); Gregory Mitchell, Empirical Legal Scholarship as Scientific Dialogue, 83 N.C. L. 
REV. 167 (2004). 
 11. On bankruptcy valuation generally, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, A 
New Approach to Valuing Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2386 (2001); 
Jean Braucher, Getting It for You Wholesale: Making Sense of Bankruptcy Valuation of 
Collateral After Rash, 102 DICK. L. REV. 763 (1998); Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas Moers 
Mayer, Valuation in Bankruptcy, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1061 (1985); David F. Heroy & Adam R. 
Schaeffer, Valuation in Bankruptcy, in 26TH ANNUAL CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN 
BANKRUPTCY & REORGANIZATION 153 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice Course, Handbook 
Series No. 3076, 2004); and Harold S. Novikoff & Beth M. Polebaum, Valuation Issues in 
Chapter 11 Cases, SJ082 ALI-ABA 239 (2004). 
 12. On the alleged pro-debtor biases of bankruptcy judges, see DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., 
DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 194 (2001); Mechele Dick-
erson, Approving Employee Retention and Severance Programs: Judicial Discretion Run 
Amuck?, 11 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 93, 105 & n.66 (2003) (noting a widespread belief 
that “bankruptcy judges are . . . biased in favor of debtors”); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor 
in Full Control—Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code?, 57 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 99, 247, 272-73 (1983); Greg Zipes, Securitization: Challenges in the Age of 
LTV Steel Co., Inc., 2002 ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 105, 116 (2002) (“Bankruptcy judges try to 
give debtors every advantage because they may be criticized if the reorganization case 
were to fail.”); and Todd J. Zywicki, The Past, Present, and Future of Bankruptcy Law in 
America, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2016, 2017 (2003). 
 13. See EDWARD R. MORRISON, BANKRUPTCY DECISION-MAKING: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
OF SMALL-BUSINESS BANKRUPTCIES (Columbia Law Sch., Ctr. for Law & Econ. Studies, 
Working Paper No. 239, 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=461031 
(last visited Sept. 8, 2004) (finding that the actual behavior of bankruptcy judges in Chap-
ter 11 cases contradicts the conventional wisdom that they are pro-debtor). While Professor 
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 More specifically, the study found that in cases where the bank-
ruptcy judge reached a valuation in between those contended for by 
the parties (1) bankruptcy judges on average allocated 65.2% of the 
value in controversy to debtors (that is, loss-averse parties opposing 
a wealth transfer) and only 34.8% to secured creditors (that is, risk-
neutral or relatively less loss-averse parties seeking a wealth trans-
fer); and (2) bankruptcy judges were more than three times as likely 
to allocate most of the value in controversy to debtors as they were to 
secured creditors. 
II.   THE STUDY 
A.   Motivation 
 The study undertaken here tests for empirical support for the 
loss aversion theory of legal valuation generally and for the more 
specific claim that bankruptcy judges are “pro-debtor.” There is al-
ready considerable anecdotal evidence suggesting that bankruptcy 
judges are “pro-debtor,”14 and loss aversion bias provides a theory to 
explain why they might be. But more than anecdotal evidence is 
needed to conclude that bankruptcy judges are in fact pro-debtor, 
particularly since a recent empirical study has cast some doubt on 
the claim.15 
 Why look at valuation specifically in the bankruptcy context? 
Because if there is anything to the loss aversion theory of legal 
valuation, one surely would expect loss aversion bias to find ex-
pression in the valuation decisions of bankruptcy judges. Bank-
ruptcy valuation disputes typically pit a highly risk-averse party 
(the debtor or unsecured creditors) against a risk-neutral or rela-
tively less risk-averse party (secured creditors). If loss aversion 
indeed affects judicial valuation behavior, one would expect bank-
ruptcy judges to tilt their valuation decisions in favor of loss-
averse debtors and unsecured creditors and against risk-neutral 
secured creditors.16 
                                                                                                                    
Morrison’s study concerns the issue of liquidating business debtors and the study here 
deals with valuing the collateral of individual debtors, the studies are nevertheless in some 
tension because a priori one would expect bankruptcy judges to be just as averse to the 
losses experienced by the owners, managers, and employees of business debtors as they are 
to those faced by individual debtors. 
 14. See sources cited supra note 12. 
 15. See MORRISON, supra note 13 (finding, contrary to the conventional wisdom, that 
bankruptcy judges efficiently liquidate debtor firms rather than allow them to operate in 
financial distress indefinitely). 
 16. For a useful description of the intuition behind possible pro-debtor bias in con-
nection with the valuation of collateral, see Theodore Eisenberg, The Undersecured 
Creditor in Reorganizations and the Nature of Security, 38 VAND. L. REV. 931, 948 (1985) 
(“A reorganization court dealing with a financially distressed debtor might err, even 
subconsciously, on the side of undervaluing collateral. Undervaluing collateral enables 
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 Consider the following very common situation. Debtor, an indi-
vidual with regular income, faces a temporary economic setback (due, 
say, to a fire that destroyed her uninsured home). Unable to pay her 
bills, she petitions for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy 
Code.17 Most of Debtor’s creditors are unsecured. But one of them is 
GMAC, which previously had financed Debtor’s purchase of a GM car 
and had secured the loan by taking a security interest in the vehicle. 
GMAC’s claim against Debtor will be allowed as a secured claim “to 
the extent of the value” of the car.18 If Debtor elects to retain rather 
than surrender the car, GMAC would have the right to insist that 
Debtor’s Chapter 13 adjustment plan provide for full payment of 
GMAC’s allowed secured claim.19 How the bankruptcy court values 
the car could thus affect the size of Debtor’s scheduled payments un-
der the plan. The higher the valuation of the secured creditor’s col-
lateral, the higher must be the Debtor’s payments.20 
 In her plan, Debtor will likely propose a low but plausible valua-
tion. If GMAC objects to Debtor’s plan, it will likely propose in sup-
port of its objection a higher but also plausible value. What the bank-
ruptcy court will do is difficult to predict. It might accept Debtor’s 
valuation, or GMAC’s, or pick some number in between. The Su-
preme Court has tried to give bankruptcy judges some guidance on 
how to make valuations of this sort, instructing them to value debtor-
retained collateral under a “replacement-value standard”—that is, 
“the cost the debtor would incur to obtain a like asset for the same 
‘proposed . . . use.’”21 But bankruptcy courts continue to be all over 
                                                                                                                    
the debtor to use the collateral at a lower cost and, therefore, enhances the chances for 
successful reorganization. Erroneous overvaluation of collateral may increase a debtor’s 
costs to the point of endangering the reorganization. Thus, a bankruptcy court with an 
inclination towards a reorganization might naturally err on the side of undervaluing col-
lateral.”). Cf. Alan Schwartz, The Enforceability of Security Interests in Consumer Goods, 
26 J.L. & ECON. 117 (1983) (recognizing that debtors may value the right to retain col-
lateral more highly than the collateral’s market value and thus more highly than would 
a repossessing creditor).  
 17. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (2000). 
 18. See id. § 506(a) (“An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in 
which the estate has an interest . . . is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such 
creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property, . . . and is an unsecured claim to 
the extent that the value of such creditor’s interest . . . is less than the amount of such al-
lowed claim. Such value shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of 
the proposed disposition or use of such property . . . .”). 
 19. See id. § 1325(a)(5). 
 20. For useful descriptions and discussions of this type of Chapter 13 valuation litiga-
tion, see Braucher, supra note 11; and David Gray Carlson, Car Wars: Valuation Stan-
dards in Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Cases, 13 BANKR. DEV. J. 1 (1996). A similar valuation is-
sue arises when individual debtors in Chapter 7 exercise their right to redeem property 
under 11 U.S.C. § 722. See David Gray Carlson, Redemption and Reinstatement in Chapter 
7 Cases, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 289 (1996). 
 21. Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 965 (1997) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 
506(a)). 
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the map in applying the replacement-value standard,22 which is 
nearly as slippery as the statutory language it sought to clarify.23 
 A non-behaviorist looking at this frequently recurring bankruptcy 
valuation problem might say that valuation is inherently imprecise, 
that bankruptcy judges are making factual determinations as best 
they can, and that there is little else that legal scholarship can say 
about how bankruptcy judges are likely to handle the valuation prob-
lem. A behaviorist, however, might say that bankruptcy judges are 
likely, other things being equal, to tilt in favor of loss-averse debtors 
and give the collateral a relatively low valuation within the zone of 
plausibility, rather than tilt in favor of risk-neutral secured creditors 
who are seeking a higher valuation in order to obtain higher pay-
ments. The study here attempts to assess the accuracy of this behav-
iorist intuition. 
B.   Framework 
 Like valuation disputes generally, every bankruptcy valuation 
dispute involves a high proposed valuation, a low proposed valuation, 
and an adjudicated outcome. So the key variables in assessing bank-
ruptcy valuation judgments are (1) the debtor’s proposed valuation 
(“D”); (2) the secured creditor’s proposed valuation (“C”); and (3) the 
adjudicated value (“J”). A fourth relevant variable, the value in con-
troversy, or “stakes” (“S”), may be obtained by subtracting the low 
proposed valuation from the high proposed valuation (which in the 
case of disputes over the value of debtor-retained collateral means 
subtracting the debtor’s valuation from the creditor’s—that is, S = C 
- D).24 And finally, a fifth relevant variable (“P”) is the percentage 
share of the value in controversy allocated to the debtor, which may 
be calculated by subtracting the adjudicated value from the creditor’s 
                                                                                                                    
 22. For a sense of the range of possibilities, compare In re Smith, 307 B.R. 912, 921 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004) (adopting a judicial presumption to set retail price minus ten per-
cent as a starting point for determining the replacement value of debtor-retained collat-
eral), with In re Tripplett, 256 B.R. 594, 597-98 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000) (declining to apply 
Rash in Chapter 7 cases and adopting a liquidation valuation standard instead). See also 
Kathryn R. Heidt & Jeffrey R. Waxman, Supreme Court’s Rash Decision Fails to Scratch 
the Valuation Itch, 53 BUS. LAW. 1345, 1359-75, 1380 (1998) (discussing post-Rash valua-
tion cases and concluding that bankruptcy valuation remains uncertain in the wake of 
Rash). 
 23. See Assocs. Commercial Corp., 520 U.S. at 965 n.6 (“[T]he replacement-value 
standard . . . leaves to bankruptcy courts, as triers of fact, identification of the best way of 
ascertaining replacement value on the basis of the evidence presented.”). 
 24. Note that in other contexts, the secured creditor might well favor a low rather 
than high valuation—e.g., cases where the debtor surrenders the collateral; reorganization 
cases where the value in issue is the reorganizing entity itself such that the secured credi-
tor’s share would be greater the less the court decides the reorganizing entity is worth. 
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proposed valuation and then dividing the sum by the value in contro-
versy (that is, P = (C – J)/S ).25 
 This framework has two main advantages. First, calculating the 
debtor’s allocation not as a raw number but rather as a percentage 
share normalizes the variable across cases with stakes of varying 
sizes and thereby facilitates meaningful comparison across cases. Us-
ing percentages in this way to facilitate cross-case comparison is a 
common technique in legal valuation scholarship.26 Second, assessing 
what valuation litigants obtain in court in relation to what they have 
asked for is a useful way to cut through the bewildering fog of rheto-
ric and valuation methodologies that courts employ in valuation liti-
gation and focus instead on what courts actually do rather than on 
what they say.27  
 Historically, a results-oriented focus was not the usual approach 
in studies of bankruptcy valuation, which tended to emphasize valua-
tion doctrines and methods rather than the systematic study of 
valuation results.28 Some recent work has focused more on results 
than has been done in the past, but has considered valuation out-
comes not in relation to what the parties have asked for but rather in 
comparison to objective indicators of market value.29 Other recent 
bankruptcy valuation scholarship has recognized the role and impor-
tance of party differences in valuation disputes, but has focused on 
contractual mechanisms for resolving such differences rather than on 
their relationship to litigation outcomes.30  
                                                                                                                    
 25. The idea here is that the debtor’s percentage share of the value in controversy is 
captured by the distance between the valuation the creditor asks for and the valuation it 
obtains in proportion to the distance between the parties. If the court agrees entirely with 
the creditor’s valuation (i.e., if J = C), then the debtor’s allocated share of the value in con-
troversy is zero. Conversely, if the court entirely agrees with the debtor’s valuation (i.e., J 
= D), then the debtor’s share is 100% (i.e., (C – J) = (C – D) = S; therefore, (C – J)/S = (C – 
J)/(C – J) = 1). And so forth.  
 26. See, e.g., Joel Seligman, Reappraising the Appraisal Remedy, 52 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 829, 850-51 (1984). 
 27. As Seligman explains, valuation results, rather than doctrine or method, ought to 
be the focus of legal valuation scholarship. Id. at 855 (advocating empirical analysis of cor-
porate valuation “results themselves” rather than a “focus on how results are obtained”). 
 28. See, e.g., Fortgang & Mayer, supra note 11. 
 29. For example, a recent bankruptcy valuation study compared “negotiated reorgani-
zation values” agreed to by parties in Chapter 11 proceedings with various indirect meas-
ures of market or “intrinsic” value, such as the reorganized entity’s post-reorganization 
market capitalization. See Marcus Bernard Butler III, Valuation Conflicts in Corporate 
Bankruptcy (2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago Graduate School 
of Business), available at http://www.ssb.rochester.edu/fac/Butler/chithesis_final.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 8, 2004). 
 30. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & DONALD S. BERNSTEIN, RELATIVE PRIORITY IN AN ABSOLUTE 
PRIORITY WORLD (Am. Law & Econ. Ass’n Annual Meetings, Working Paper No. 59, 2004) 
(describing and discussing the use of options contracts to resolve valuation disputes, as in 
the recent Conseco bankruptcy), available at http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art59 (last 
visited Sept. 8, 2004). 
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 In contrast to earlier and contemporaneous work, the approach 
taken here is to examine how judges allocate the value in controversy 
in valuation litigation. That is, the valuations that litigants contend 
for are considered in relation to the adjudicated valuation outcomes 
they later obtain. Analysis of how courts allocate the value in contro-
versy among valuation litigants is an approach to legal valuation 
scholarship that, so far as I know, originates with me.31 And the 
study undertaken here is the first empirical application of that ap-
proach. 
C.   Data Selection 
 With a sensible set of variables to look for, two questions re-
mained: What data should be collected, and which of the collected 
data should be kept rather than discarded? My thought was to 
search for recent bankruptcy opinions addressing valuation dis-
putes where each side’s proposed valuation was reported along 
with the adjudicated outcome. I therefore searched the Westlaw 
bankruptcy case database for cases containing a word with the 
root “valu!” within close range of a word with the root “propos!” 
and looked at cases digested by West in its annotated version of 
the United States Code following 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (the provision 
of the Bankruptcy Code concerning the valuation of collateral), as 
well as cases citing the Rash decision (the leading Supreme Court 
decision on valuing collateral in bankruptcy). 
 The search was, inevitably, both over- and underinclusive. Many 
of the cases did not involve valuation disputes at all, or involved 
valuation disputes but did not report all three of the variables nec-
essary for the study. Cases falling in these categories were dis-
carded. Other cases containing the necessary variables were surely 
missed. 
 A further category of disregarded cases merits special mention 
and explanation. Some of the cases generated by the search that re-
ported data for all three variables necessary for the study (D, C, and 
J) were nevertheless discarded. This was done where the adjudi-
cated value (J) was found to be equal to one of the party valuations 
rather than determined to be an amount in between. The reason for 
discarding these one-sided cases, some of which were won by the 
creditor32 and others by the debtor,33 was that the judicial valua-
                                                                                                                    
 31. See Sharfman, supra note 3, at 370-71 (focusing analysis on the amount of value 
in controversy rather than on the overall value of the entitlement in question). 
 32. Identified cases allocating 100% of the value in controversy to the creditor include 
Evabank v. Baxter, 278 B.R. 867 (N.D. Ala. 2002); and In re Russell, 211 B.R. 12 (Bankr. 
E.D.N.C. 1997). 
 33. Identified cases allocating 100% of the value in controversy to the debtor include 
In re Weathington, 254 B.R. 895 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2000); Consumer Portfolio Services, Inc. v. 
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tions reported in them were less likely to be products of the exercise 
of judicial discretion than cases where J fell between D and C. This 
is so because complete adoption of one side’s valuation suggests that 
the judge felt constrained in some way (either factually or legally) 
and thus was not exercising judicial discretion when making the 
valuation. A frequent example of this occurs when one party fails to 
back its valuation with any credible evidence. In such a case, the 
judge will usually feel constrained to adopt the other side’s valua-
tion, even if the judge might otherwise have been inclined to choose 
a compromise figure if the party failing to offer evidence in support 
of its valuation had actually presented a plausible valuation. The 
study was thus limited to only the clearest examples of discretion-
ary judicial valuation—that is, cases where the judge imposed a 
compromise figure in between those contended for by the parties. If 
bankruptcy judges are motivated by loss aversion, that aversion is 
most likely evident in this category of cases. 
 In the end, after appropriately discarding cases to ensure that 
the sample studied would be representative, only a relatively small 
number (twenty-four) were left on which to perform the study. But a 
sample of twenty-four valuation disputes is probably large enough 
for the study to still be useful.34 And if more cases meeting the 
study’s criteria are found, the sample could always be enlarged in 
subsequent research.  
D.   Results 
 The results obtained in the study are summarized in Table 1 be-
low. The main findings are that in the bankruptcy valuation dis-
putes studied (1) bankruptcy judges on average allocated 65.2% of 
the value in controversy to debtors and only 34.8% to secured credi-
tors; and (2) bankruptcy judges were more than three times as 
likely to allocate most of the value in controversy to debtors as they 
were to secured creditors.35 
                                                                                                                    
Martina, No. 01 C 50424, 2002 WL 449283 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 21, 2002); In re Bouzek, 311 B.R. 
239 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2004); In re Barse, 301 B.R. 404 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2003), aff’d, 309 
B.R. 109 (W.D.N.Y. 2004); In re Podnar, 307 B.R. 667 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2003); In re Zell, 
284 B.R. 569 (Bankr. D. Md. 2002); In re Ard, 280 B.R. 910 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 2002); In re 
Duggins, 263 B.R. 233 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2001); In re Dunbar, 234 B.R. 895 (Bankr. E.D. 
Tenn. 1999). 
 34. Compare Seligman, supra note 26, at 855-56 & n.115, which analyzed a data 
set of only twelve corporate valuation cases—a sample deemed representative enough 
for use in a later study. See Kenton K. Yee, Judicial Valuation and the Rise of DCF, 
PUB. FUND DIG., 2002, at 76, 81-82 (performing further tests on the Seligman sample). 
 35. The “more than three times as likely” figure is based on the fact that the 
debtor’s allocated share exceeded 50% in seventeen of the disputes studied and was 
less than 50% in only five of the cases studied. Seventeen is more than three times as 
many as five. 
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TABLE 1 
SHARE OF VALUE IN CONTROVERSY ALLOCATED TO DEBTOR IN SELECT 
BANKRUPTCY VALUATION DISPUTES36 
  DEBTOR'S CREDITOR'S ADJUDICATED VALUE IN DEBTOR'S 
CASES VALUE VALUE VALUE CONTROVERSY SHARE 
In re Stark, 311 B.R. 750 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004) 14,500 24,850 17,475 10,350 71.3% 
In re Washington, 2003 WL 22119519 (Bankr. E.D. Ark.) 29,500 37,825 30,000 8,325 94.0% 
In re Boise, 2003 WL 1955759 (Bankr. D. Vt.) 8,000 8,750 8,250 750 66.7% 
In re Gonzalez, 295 B.R. 584 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2003) 1,000 7,495 2,411 6,495 78.3% 
In re Stembridge, 287 B.R. 658 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002) 9,540 13,475 12,825 3,935 16.5% 
In re Gray, 285 B.R. 379 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002) 4,640 6,850 5,745 2,210 50.0% 
In re Cline, 275 B.R. 523 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2001) 15,000 26,500 18,500 11,500 69.6% 
In re Marquez, 270 B.R. 761 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2001) 11,000 15,500 13,674 4,500 40.6% 
In re Ballard, 258 B.R. 707 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2001) 7,925 9,820 8,025 1,895 94.7% 
In re Richards, 243 B.R. 15 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1999) 6,000 10,350 7,850 4,350 57.5% 
In re Getz, 242 B.R. 916 (6th Cir. B.A.P. 2000) 7,500 8,825 7,937 1,325 67.0% 
In re Winston, 236 B.R. 167 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1999) 9,150 15,280 9,537 6,130 93.7% 
In re Renzelman, 227 B.R. 740 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1998) 11,272 12,950 11,471 1,678 88.1% 
In re Lyles, 226 B.R. 854 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1998) 12,375 15,650 14,450 3,275 36.6% 
In re McCutchen, 224 B.R. 373 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1998) 4,000 8,025 6,150 4,025 46.6% 
In re Glueck, 223 B.R. 514 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1998) 12,350 14,100 12,925 1,750 67.1% 
In re Oglesby, 221 B.R. 515 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1998) 7,700 8,400 8,050 700 50.0% 
In re Younger, 216 B.R. 649 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1998) 11,988 14,575 12,200 2,587 91.8% 
In re Franklin, 213 B.R. 781 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1997) 14,000 17,000 15,418 3,000 52.7% 
In re McElroy, 210 B.R. 833 (Bankr. D. Or. 1997) (truck) 5,600 8,603 5,950 3,003 88.3% 
In re McElroy, 210 B.R. 833 (Bankr. D. Or. 1997) (car) 1,200 2,315 1,570 1,115 66.8% 
In re Sharon, 200 B.R. 181 (S.D. Ohio 1996) 23,500 26,250 24,737 2,750 55.0% 
In re Duggar, 1996 WL 537837 (Bankr. S.D. Ga.) 7,500 11,325 9,500 3,825 47.7% 
In re Angel, 147 B.R. 48 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1992) 6,075 11,000 7,375 4,925 73.6% 
      
AVERAGE SHARE ALLOCATED TO DEBTOR: 65.2%     
  
E.   Analysis and Implications 
 The results reported here suggest that when bankruptcy judges 
are faced with a plausible choice between competing valuations, they 
are three times more likely than not to exercise discretion in favor of 
the debtor and on average do so in a substantial way (by the margin 
of 65.2% to 34.8%). The data do not themselves reveal why bank-
ruptcy judges favor debtors in valuation disputes; just that they do. 
But loss aversion supplies a plausible explanation for the pro-debtor 
tilt that we observe in the cases: namely, that bankruptcy judges im-
plicitly value debtor losses (that is, the cost of making payments to 
the secured creditor) more highly than creditor gains (that is, the 
benefit of receiving payments from the debtor).37 
                                                                                                                    
 36. The figures reported here are rounded to the nearest dollar or tenth of a percent. 
The overall result reported at the bottom of the table is based on an equally weighted av-
erage of the averages in the “Debtor’s Share” column. 
 37. To be sure, it is possible to explain the data without resort to a bias theory. It may 
well be that secured creditors, perhaps because they are repeat players who wish to estab-
lish reputations as tough valuation litigants, are systematically more aggressive than 
debtors in the valuation positions that they take. But it is difficult to see why debtors 
(whose lawyers are repeat players even if their clients are not) would not have just as pow-
erful an incentive to litigate aggressively.  
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 Suppose it is true that bankruptcy judges favor debtors in valua-
tion disputes and that loss aversion bias explains this behavior. Still 
it would not be clear what, if anything, should be done about it. It 
may be entirely sensible as a matter of bankruptcy policy to respect a 
judicial preference that losses should count for more than gains of 
equal financial size. While such a policy approach would be inconsis-
tent with the goal of wealth maximization in the Kaldor-Hicks 
sense,38 it would hardly be the first instance of a policy departure 
from that ideal. Moreover, sensitivity to loss aversion could well be 
utility-maximizing even if wealth-reducing. Finally, if bankruptcy 
judges have pro-debtor biases, non-bankruptcy judges (and juries) 
are likely to have them too—and so restraining pro-debtor bias in the 
bankruptcy area exclusively would encourage forum shopping and 
violate the basic principle of respecting non-bankruptcy entitlements 
in bankruptcy.39  
 While this study does not suggest any need to reassess bank-
ruptcy policy, its findings do have implications for reform of the pro-
cedures generally used to resolve valuation disputes. In previous 
work I have argued that “valuation averaging”—a process whereby 
valuation disputes are resolved by averaging parties’ valuation pro-
posals with each other and (if they are far enough apart) with that of 
a neutral expert—would be a useful measure to adopt.40 Although 
suggested as a substantive enactment rather than a procedural 
rule,41 the proposal was intended to be substantively neutral on av-
erage with respect to outcomes. A background assumption underly-
ing the proposal was that factfinders in valuation disputes tend on 
average to “split the difference” roughly equally between the parties 
(though the split is not necessarily equal in any given case).42 For 
valuation disputes of the type in which factfinders tend on average to 
split differences equally, a fifty-fifty weighting of the respective 
plaintiff and defendant valuations would achieve substantive neu-
trality relative to average current outcomes. But for particular litiga-
tion contexts where empirical research shows that factfinders do not 
on average split the difference equally (for example, the sixty-five to 
thirty-five average allocation found here for bankruptcy valuation 
disputes with respect to debtor-retained collateral), valuation averag-
ing could be implemented with substantive neutrality only by attach-
                                                                                                                    
 38. On wealth maximization and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency as criteria of social choice, 
see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.2, at 13 (6th ed. 2003). 
 39. The policy of protecting non-bankruptcy entitlements in bankruptcy is often re-
ferred to as “the Butner principle” after the case that established the doctrine. See Butner 
v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979); Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy 
Entitlements, and the Creditors’ Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. (1982). 
 40. Sharfman, supra note 3, at 370-79. 
 41. See id. at 370 n.46. 
 42. Id. at 359 & nn.6-7. 
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ing weights to the party values used in the valuation averaging proc-
ess that approximate the average results that courts reach outside it. 
 This is not to say that substantive neutrality is an absolute must. 
Rather, the point is that while substantive neutrality may or may not 
be something that policymakers would wish to achieve when shifting 
from current valuation processes to a valuation averaging-type proc-
ess, the substantive impact of such a shift (if any) is something that 
they probably will wish to (and at any rate should) take into account. 
Further empirical studies of the sort undertaken here would help 
policymakers to do that. 
III.   CONCLUSION 
 This Article presents an empirical study of the valuation behavior 
of bankruptcy judges in disputes between debtors and secured credi-
tors over the value of debtor-retained collateral. The motivation for 
conducting the study was to find empirical support for what a behav-
iorist might call the loss aversion theory of legal valuation, which is 
the idea that legal decisionmakers tend to value losses more highly 
than gains of equal financial size. An implication of the theory is that 
bankruptcy judges will tend to favor loss-averse debtors over gain-
seeking secured creditors in disputes with potential loss conse-
quences for the debtors (such as disputes concerning the value of 
debtor-retained collateral)—which is just another way of stating the 
conventional wisdom that bankruptcy judges tend to be pro-debtor. 
 Empirical support was found for both the loss aversion theory of 
legal valuation and the pro-debtor bias intuition. The study’s main 
findings were that in the bankruptcy valuation disputes studied (1) 
bankruptcy judges on average allocated 65.2% of the value in contro-
versy to debtors and only 34.8% to secured creditors; and (2) bank-
ruptcy judges were nearly three times as likely to allocate most of the 
value in controversy to debtors as they were to secured creditors. 
These findings suggest that bankruptcy judges may indeed have a 
pro-debtor orientation. And they are consistent with, and indeed may 
best be explained by, the loss aversion theory. 
 As a normative matter, the study’s findings likely do not have im-
portant implications for bankruptcy policy. While evidence of pro-
debtor bias among bankruptcy judges may seem to cry out for reform, 
the reality is that a pro-debtor judicial tilt could well be sensible 
bankruptcy policy, given the widespread preference among individu-
als to value losses more highly than gains of equal financial value. It 
is true that allowing loss aversion to find expression in bankruptcy 
policy is at odds with considerations of wealth maximization and 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. But public policy often subordinates effi-
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ciency to other concerns, and concern about loss aversion could well 
justify bankruptcy valuation outcomes that depart from efficiency.  
 The empirical study here and other potential studies of a similar 
nature may, however, have normative implications beyond the bank-
ruptcy context for general reform of the processes by which valuation 
disputes are resolved. The study here demonstrates that party valua-
tion differences are not on average split equally in bankruptcy valua-
tion disputes, and similarly asymmetric difference splitting may be 
the norm for valuation disputes in other contexts as well. The possi-
bility of systematically non-equal difference splitting means that 
shifting to more mechanical valuation procedures such as “value av-
eraging” would in some contexts not be achievable with substantive 
neutrality absent the attachment of asymmetric weightings to the 
parties’ respective positions. Finding the appropriate calibration of 
these weightings for particular contexts will require further, context-
specific empirical study. 
 
